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Diagnosis as dialogue: historical and 
current perspectives
Paul Hoff, MD, PhD; Anke Maatz, MD, PhD; Johannes Simon Vetter, MSc, PhD
Ever since psychiatry emerged as a clinical discipline and field of scientific inquiry in the late 18th century, debates 
about diagnosis have been at its very heart. Considered by many a requirement for clinical communication as well as for 
systematic study, others have critiqued psychiatric diagnosis for being modeled on a medical conception of disease that 
is ill-suited to the specific nature of mental disorders. Based on a review of seminal positions in the conceptual history of 
psychiatry and an examination of their epistemological underpinnings, we propose to consider diagnosis as dialogue. Such 
understanding, we argue, can serve as a meta-framework that provides a conceptual and practical umbrella to encourage 
open-minded conversation across the diverse conceptual and experiential frameworks that are characteristic of psychiatry. In 
this perspective psychopathology will also reinforce the interpersonal realm as a necessary element of any clinical encounter, 
be it diagnostic in purpose or otherwise. Current challenges to traditional diagnostic systems like Research Domain Criteria 
(RDoC) and Hierarchical Taxonomy of Psychopathology (HiTOP) are discussed in light of these considerations.
© 2019, AICH - Servier Group Dialogues Clin Neurosci. 2020;22(1):27-35. doi:10.31887/DCNS.2020.22.1/phoff
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Introduction: The entangled nature of 
psychiatric diagnosis
Ever since psychiatry emerged as an independent clinical 
discipline and field of scientific inquiry in the late 18th 
century, debates about the concept (and content) of diag-
nosis have been at its very heart. Considered by many a 
requirement for clinical communication as well as for 
systematic study, others have critiqued psychiatric diagnosis 
for being modeled on a medical—in the sense of somatic—
conception of disease that is ill-suited to the specific nature 
of mental disorders. Proponents of this latter position argue 
that psychiatric diagnosis disregards the complex individ-
uality of any given person as well as cultural influences 
on diagnostic conceptions.1 Taking this critical perspective 
further, “anti-psychiatrists” have claimed that psychiatric 
diagnosis is entirely normative—as opposed to descrip-
tive—and a means of societal oppression.2 A different, but 
related, point of critique has been the worry that psychiatric 
diagnosis rests too much on the assessment of the individual 
clinician, and that it grossly overrates intuition and personal 
experience, thereby giving an unacceptably high degree of 
power to the diagnostician and making diagnosis unreliable.
Whilst some criticisms, especially the lack of reliability, 
have been addressed by more recent research on and 
developments of diagnostic systems, the general points of 
contention remain: The epistemological dichotomy between 
conceptions of psychiatry as a quantifying nomothetic 
science searching for general rules behind the individual 
case on the one hand, and the (much older) “ars medica- 
approach” with its focus on qualitative, subjective 
phenomena to do with the individual person and thus 
being idiographic in nature on the other hand, results in 
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conceptions of psychiatric diagnosis as “carving nature at 
its joints”3 as opposed to views according to which psychi-
atric diagnosis is per se unfounded.4 Debates about diag-
nosis can thus not be separated from debates about broader 
nosological and epistemological frameworks, and diagnosis 
necessarily mirrors the entangled nature of mental disorders.
What are we to do then if we take up a pragmatic position 
of minimal epistemological consensus and agree that diag-
nosis can indeed be helpful to condense information and 
thereby ensure reliable communication in clinical, research, 
and teaching contexts?
In this article, we propose to consider diagnosis as dialogue. 
This implies that we ought to be aware, and teach aware-
ness, that diagnosis cannot be reduced to clear-cut, unequiv-
ocally applicable algorithms, but needs to be accompanied 
by reflection and discussion of its nosological, epistemolog-
ical, and anthropological underpinnings.
To argue for such a conception, we first give an overview of 
landmark positions on diagnosis in the conceptual history 
of Western psychiatry. We then work out the general noso-
logical frameworks underlying these positions, highlighting 
their implications for the epistemological status of diag-
nosis. Finally, current approaches to diagnosis are reviewed 
in light of these considerations. Diagnosis as dialogue, as we 
understand it, can serve as a meta-framework not to blur the 
lines where there are ontological or epistemological incom-
mensurabilities between diagnostic systems, but to provide a 
conceptual and practical umbrella to make underlying theo-
retical assumptions explicit and to encourage open-minded 
conversation across diverse conceptual and experiential 
frameworks, both amongst clinicians and researchers as 
well as between clinicians and patients.
Landmark positions on diagnosis in the 
conceptual history of Western psychiatry
Two markedly different anthropological approaches accom-
panied and influenced the very beginning of psychiatry as 
a medical discipline: The era of Enlightenment in the 18th 
century brought forward a strongly rational understanding 
of personhood and citizenship as well as an optimistic 
stance on the scientific comprehensibility, not to say mastery 
of our world. Autonomous and responsible decision making 
became one of the hallmarks of being a person. In turn, not 
being able to make use of one’s own rational powers was 
increasingly conceptualized not only as a deficit, but as an 
illness calling for medical diagnosis and treatment. Thus, 
the conceptual framework for establishing psychiatric diag-
nosis was rationalism.
Some decades later, at the beginning of the 19th century, 
romanticism regarded a rationalistic attitude as simplifying 
and laid emphasis on the affective, not to say the irrational, 
dimension of human experience and behavior. Mental 
disorders were now regarded as consequences of excessive 
or otherwise disturbed affective states: Some authors saw 
a direct link between such affective instabilities and the 
person’s attitudes and lifestyle, thus attributing at least a 
significant part of the responsibility for becoming mentally 
ill to the patient himself or herself. The scope of psychiatric 
diagnosis thereby became broader and more value-laden 
as it conceived of mental illness as an aberration from the 
proper way of life. Here, the individual biography, personal 
attitudes, and accepted moral values of a given cultural 
context shaped the process of generating a psychiatric diag-
nosis.
Wilhelm Griesinger (1817-1868), a central figure in the 
conceptual history of psychiatry, pursued the under-
standing of psychiatry as an integral part of medicine, 
thus strictly departing from speculative philosophical 
approaches that had prevailed in the romantic era. Psychi-
atry should adopt empirical research methods, especially 
concerning the brain: Griesinger was therefore one of 
the founders of neuroscience, but he also insisted on the 
limitations of such an approach and warned not to prema-
turely accept oversimplifying views.5 As for nosology, he 
vouched for the existence of just one all-embracing mental 
illness, the “unitary psychosis” (“Einheitspsychose”). He 
argued that there exists only one single mental disorder 
that in its different stages may exhibit the whole spectrum 
of psychopathological phenomena.6 Hence, for Griesinger, 
diagnosis was centered around the clinical picture, its 
course in time, and possible correlations with brain 
dysfunctions, but not around presumably distinct noso-
logical entities.
Based on Karl Ludwig Kahlbaum’s (1828-1899) 
proposal7 to direct psychiatric research towards specific 
patterns in the temporality of defined clinical syndromes 
(“syndrome-course-entities”, “Syndrom-Verlaufs-Ein-
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heiten”), Emil Kraepelin (1856-1926) strongly and 
sustainably favored the idea of the existence and scien-
tific detectability of “natural disease entities” (“natürliche 
Krankheitseinheiten”).8,9 He saw these entities as objec-
tive parts of nature, as given things, although he accepted 
different scientific ways to detect them: research on etiology, 
on pathological anatomy, or on clin-
ical course. From this perspective, 
psychiatric diagnoses were tools to 
get as close as possible to “real” 
nosological entities.
Eugen Bleuler’s influential innova-
tion in the present context—espe-
cially regarding “dementia praecox,” 
reconceptualized by him as “group 
of schizophrenias”—was to explic-
itly acknowledge a hermeneutical—specifically: a psycho-
analytical—approach as a scientific element of psychiatric 
diagnosis, therapy, and research, notably without deempha-
sizing the role of descriptive and neurobiological factors.10 
Bleuler enriched the scope of diagnosis by the psychody-
namic dimension, in this specific respect resembling ideas 
of “romantic psychiatry” a century before (see above).
The assumption that mental disorders were manifestations 
of a transgenerational process of “degeneration” (“Entar-
tung”), although lacking a sound scientific basis and 
conceptual rigor, became highly influential in medicine in 
the late 19th century.11 Psychiatry was no exception; on the 
contrary: Most contemporary textbooks introduced chap-
ters on “degenerative psychoses” or similar terms. Here, the 
process of diagnosis in a way succumbed to the underlying 
dogma by focusing on the detection of (somatic or psycho-
pathological) “stigmata degenerationis” (Cesare Lombro-
so’s (1835-1909) “Criminal anthropology”12 is a prominent 
example for this approach, but by far not the only one), 
thus grossly disregarding the subjective and interpersonal 
dimensions. This may be a drastic example of neglecting the 
patient’s individuality, of the very opposite of person-cen-
teredness. However, any diagnostic approach in psychiatry 
does, in principle, carry this risk.
Considering the conceptual cornerstones of what became 
known as “psychotherapy” during the 20th century, further 
frameworks, embedding the diagnostic process, emerged: 
In the psychoanalytical perspective, diagnosis cannot be 
neatly separated from therapy since the prominent role of 
interpretation both of the patient’s narratives and the ther-
apeutic relationship essentially influences any single act 
within psychotherapy. As opposed to this, behaviorism, at 
least in its early phase, placed emphasis on the patient’s 
empirically observable and, therefore, quantifiable behavior, 
thus keeping its distance from the 
hermeneutical approach as well as 
from possible neurobiological under-
pinnings. Anthropological psychi-
atry emerged after World War II and, 
in fact, dominated psychiatric liter-
ature for a couple of years. It radi-
cally opposed the crude biologism 
and social Darwinism of psychiatry 
during the era of national socialism. 
Authors like Ludwig Binswanger 
(1881-1966)13 and Wolfgang Blankenburg (1928-2002)14 
advocated a person- and biography-oriented approach, 
partly resembling, but not identical with the psychoana-
lytic one, that searched for a meaningful link between the 
patient’s mental disorder and his or her individual life. Note 
that the neurobiological dimension was not neglected in this 
view. It was credited as necessary, but not sufficient, not as 
the essential precondition of adequately dealing with the 
phenomenon of mental illness.
Systemic psychotherapy with its partly eclectic approach 
enriched the scope of psychotherapy by emphasizing the 
relevance of the patient’s social context, especially his or her 
family and occupational situation. Diagnosis had to encom-
pass a much broader range of relevant information than, 
eg, in descriptive clinical psychopathology. (This outline of 
major theoretical approaches in psychotherapy focuses on 
the perspective of conceptual history. Towards the end of the 
20th century, eclectic models were developed that explic-
itly drew on different schools of thought, eg, the Cognitive 
Behavioral Analysis System of Psychotherapy15).
Concurrent to the discovery of new and effective psycho-
pharmacological agents and their subsequent implemen-
tation into psychiatric practice starting from about 1950 
onwards, the disadvantages of the highly heterogeneous 
field of psychiatric diagnosis (and nosology) became 
obvious. Large-scale international clinical studies depended 
on a common diagnostic language and especially on its 
reliability in order to quantify therapeutic response, side 
Recent approaches raise 
fundamental questions  
about psychiatric nosology  
and the epistemological  
status of diagnosis
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effects, and course of illness under treatment. This situation 
(together with the arrival of modern neuroscientific research 
methods as biochemistry or brain imaging) prompted the 
development of operationalized rating scales and, ulti-
mately, diagnostic manuals such as ICD-1016 or DSM-III.17 
They strongly focus on reliability and, in order to achieve 
it, on precise definitions of psychopathological terms and 
diagnostic algorithms. This descriptive approach endeavors 
to avoid implicit theoretical presuppositions, especially 
regarding etiology and treatment of mental disorders. Not 
what, eg, schizophrenia “really is” or how it should be 
optimally treated, but how the term schizophrenia can be 
defined and used in a reliable way, is the very core of oper-
ationalized diagnosis in psychiatry (nominalistic approach, 
see below). Not leaving these common grounds, but as an 
amplification of ICD-10, additional concepts have been 
proposed and clinically adapted, for instance, the “Opera-
tionalized Psychodynamic Diagnosis.”18
In a remarkable step beyond the “atheoretical” ambition of 
ICD-10, ICD-11 arranges disorders on the basis of shared 
putative etiological and pathophysiological features (eg, 
disorders associated with stress) as well as shared clin-
ical phenomenology (eg, dissociative disorders).19 Besides 
several new diagnoses and alterations to existing criteria of 
disorders, innovations in ICD-11 comprise the description 
of essential features of each disorder and the integration of 
a lifespan approach as well as culture-related information. 
Also, as in DSM-5, disorder groupings were ordered to be 
related to developmental psychopathology (eg, neurode-
velopmental disorders are enlisted first and neurocognitive 
disorders at the end). A major innovation is the incorpo-
ration of dimensional approaches within the framework 
of a categorical system with explicit taxonomic restric-
tions, especially applied in the classification of personality 
disorders20 (and also partially for schizophrenia and other 
primary psychotic disorders).
Still, and like DSM-5, ICD-11 in many ways offers no strict 
alternative to the current descriptive-phenomenological 
approach, and has not introduced fundamental conceptual 
alterations. One may argue, that ICD-11’s main advance 
is a technological one, ie, the transition to an electronic 
conceptual infrastructure, to a database that reflects the hier-
archical structure of the classification and integrates within 
a single logical model all categories, conceptions, entities, 
groups, synonyms, and exclusion criteria as well as their 
relations (“foundation component”21). The coding of diag-
noses is altered, offering more precise and differentiated 
combinations. The documentation, multilingual utilization, 
and translations as well as linkage to other terminologies 
are facilitated.
Finally, two distinctively critical lines of thought towards 
psychiatric diagnosis in general shall be mentioned: Firstly, 
authors who reproached psychiatry for following a much too 
narrow medical model of mental disorders and for uncriti-
cally accepting the role of a social control agent (“anti-psy-
chiatry”), regarded psychiatric diagnoses as pars pro toto 
for the alleged fundamental shortcomings of psychiatry.2 
The field of social psychiatry, emerging after 1960, took 
up, in a more moderate and pragmatic way, some of these 
arguments, especially concerning the medical model and its 
implicit risk of fostering rigid, stigmatizing and deindivid-
ualized diagnoses.22
Secondly, since about 1980 a profoundly skeptical attitude 
arose towards nosological entities in psychiatry—and, conse-
quently, towards diagnostic procedures codifying them—in 
the context of an increasingly neuroscientifically oriented 
self-understanding of psychiatry, in some respects revital-
izing ideas Wilhelm Griesinger (and others) had proposed 
more than a century ago (see above). This position strongly 
gained momentum and condensed in a new term, “denos-
ologization.” Van Praag’s plea from 198723 triggered this 
debate that has been going on up to the present day; in fact, 
it was markedly boosted by recent concepts such as Research 
Domain Criteria (RDoC)24 or Hierarchical Taxonomy of 
Psychopathology (HiTOP)25,26 and, generally, by the claim 
of the emerging fields of social neuroscience and computa-
tional psychiatry to generate “a new understanding of mental 
disorders.”27 This will be addressed in more detail below.
General nosological frameworks and their 
implications for the epistemological status of 
psychiatric diagnosis
From the conceptions of diagnosis sketched above, that have 
become influential in the history of Western psychiatry, the 
following three general nosological frameworks can be 
distilled. They differ markedly in terms of their implications 
for the epistemological status of diagnosis and entail equally 
different approaches to the diagnostic process (Figures 1 
and 2).
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Framework 1
Mental illness is a malfunction of certain parts, domains, or 
networks of the central nervous system that can be detected 
using neuroscientific methods.
Epistemologically, this approach is close to the classical 
medical model of somatic disorders. The factual exis-
tence of mental illness “within” the patient is regarded as 
completely independent from the experts’ conceptualiza-
tion. The clinician just has to “detect” (and then, of course, 
treat) the illness, and the researcher strives to “carve nature 
at its joints.”3 In philosophical terms, this is the naturalis-
tic-realistic view. (“Realism” is here to be understood in an 
epistemological sense, ie, as the assumption that “natural 
objects” or “nature” exist completely independently from 
human beings and their cognitive acts). It typically implies 
a “reification” of mental illness.28
Framework 2
Mental illness is an individual reaction to stressful life 
events or episodes.
The brain’s relevance as a necessary condition for any 
mental phenomenon is not contested here. However, in 
contrast to framework 1, the central nervous system is 
not seen as the essential etiological factor. Rather, these 
are the patient’s life experiences, personality traits, and 
social competences. The underlying basis of diagnosis is 
thus conceptualized as mental phenomena that have to be 
interpreted or understood. Hence, hermeneutical methods 
constitute the center of this framework, which may be called 
the biographical view.
Framework 3
Mental illness is a concept based on descriptive psycho-
pathological findings rather than on etiological assumptions. 
The definitions of symptoms and syndromes as well as 
diagnostic algorithms are products of an expert consensus, 
taking epidemiological and other scientific data into account 
wherever possible.
Diagnoses in this context do not claim to represent “real” 
entities that independently exist “behind” the clinical picture 
(as opposed especially to framework 1) but are conceptual 
conventions on how to use diagnostic terms. Hence, frame-
work 3 can be called the nominalistic view. Such a view 
was prominently adopted by operationalized diagnostic 
manuals, eg, ICD-10 and DSM-5. As discussed above, 
ICD-11 partially moves away from this position.
Implications for diagnosis
What are the implications of each of these frameworks for 
the epistemological status of psychiatric diagnosis and for 
the clinical process of diagnosing?
Figure 2. Overstretching methods: the risks.Figure 1. Distinctive consequences of the epistemic approach 
for the diagnostic process.
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In a strictly naturalistic view, that claims to exhaustively 
explain mental illness as brain disorder, diagnoses represent 
“natural kinds.” To diagnose accordingly means to depict 
given facts in a way that is as objective, ie, researcher- or 
clinician-independent, as possible. Critics of this viewpoint 
note the naturalistic fallacy, ie, the risk of unreflected iden-
tification of (neuro-)biological with mental phenomena.29
In the biographical view, diagnoses are patterns of experi-
ence and interindividually valid categories of meaning. In 
the diagnostic process, the clinician thus seeks to under-
stand and interpret the patient’s personal history as well as 
his or her intra- and interpersonal situation. Emphasizing 
the explanatory power of these factors bears the risk of a 
hermeneutic fallacy, ie, the unreflected identification of a 
coherent psychological model with the etiology and patho-
genesis of a given mental disorder.
Operational diagnostic manuals in psychiatry, like ICD-10 
or DSM-5, do not claim to address “real” nosological enti-
ties and therefore refrain from “reifying” mental illness. 
Instead, they construct diagnostic terms by defining rules 
or algorithms such that these terms can be reliably applied. 
One of their principal aims is not to make unnecessary theo-
retical assumptions, eg about the etiology or the “nature” of 
mental disorders, in order to be compatible with different 
methodological and cultural backgrounds. Taking this 
approach too far may result in a formalistic fallacy, ie, the 
unreflected identification of operationalized psychopatho-
logical criteria with the multifaceted mental suffering of the 
individual person.
As can be seen, there is a considerable link between noso-
logical assumptions, be they explicitly stated or only 
implicitly influential, and practical diagnostic procedures. 
Any diagnostic approach comes with theoretical baggage, 
any one has its blind spots, and none therefore ought to be 
regarded as or used as a stand-alone-technique.
Why this is relevant for the ongoing  
debate
Conceptual history of psychiatry is not “l’art pour l’art.” 
Close readings and thorough reflections on “classical” 
psychiatric positions as, for example, in the works of 
Wilhelm Griesinger, Emil Kraepelin, Sigmund Freud, or 
Eugen Bleuler, facilitate and enrich the present debate 
on psychiatric diagnosis. This argument becomes even 
stronger in view of the immense heterogeneity and 
dynamics of this debate. It is situated (and, in a way, 
oscillates) between two poles: Emil Kraepelin’s notion of 
scientifically detectable “natural disease entities” based 
on philosophical realism on the one hand,30 and the epis-
temologically more modest nominalistic approach of 
modern diagnostic manuals on the other hand. In recent 
years, both poles have been subjected to fierce criticism: 
From the 1980s onwards, the concept of “denosologi-
zation” has increasingly (re-)gained acceptance. More 
recently, it was integrated into the evolving paradigms 
of computational and dimensional psychiatry.27 “Deno-
sologization” is spurred by the worry that conventional 
psychiatric diagnoses—which are still based on Kraepe-
lin’s nosology19—are neither sufficiently valid nor reli-
able, but in fact obstruct clinical work as well as scientific 
research by narrowing down the conceptual horizon. The 
poor acceptance of diagnoses by patients, relatives, and 
the general public to do with their stigmatizing potential 
is another common argument in favor of denosologization.
This complex issue may be condensed in one question: Do 
we need a “transdiagnostic psychiatry”31 that departs from 
traditional nosological frameworks? Two recent examples of 
concepts following such a transdiagnostic path are RDoC24 
and HiTOP.25,26
RDoC epistemologically stands closer to Kraepelin’s 
postulate of the existence and scientific detectability of 
natural disease entities than to descriptive and hermeneu-
tical concepts. However, its authors claim that nosology 
has to be data-based rather than, as conventional diag-
nosis, symptom-based. The substantial heterogeneity of 
a group of patients diagnosed with, eg, major depressive 
disorder according to ICD-10, is sought to be overcome 
by integrating all available data from the domains genetic 
risk, brain activity, physiology, behavioral processes and 
life experiences, aiming to reveal data-based categories or 
clusters. These are expected to represent more homoge-
nous groups of patients than, for example, ICD-10 catego-
ries. Ultimately, the new systematics is hoped to facilitate 
specifically targeted research on future pharmacological and 
psychotherapeutic strategies.
HiTOP shares RDoC’s criticisms of the classical taxono-
mies as neither sufficiently reliable nor valid. In response, 
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it offers a data-driven psychometric methodology that 
attempts to advance consensus dimensional classification 
and thus enhance conventional diagnostic systems (like 
ICD and DSM).25 The objective is to define an inner struc-
ture of psychopathology. Using a quantitative higher-order 
dimensional and hierarchical structure of psychopathology, 
it aims at revealing underlying dimensions of psychopa-
thology and decrease artefactual comorbidity.32 In this way, 
arbitrary boundaries between disorders as well as insuffi-
cient reliability of categorical diagnoses are meant to be 
overcome.26 Within-disorder heterogeneity is addressed by 
developing dimensions based on covariations of symptoms 
thereby detecting coherent constructs. At its core, HiTOP 
proposes that psychopathological dimensions can be orga-
nized in a hierarchical order that ranges from “spectra” (eg, 
“internalizing” or “thought disorder”), to specific clusters 
of symptoms.32
The already thriving field of social neuroscience, dimen-
sional and computational psychiatry will presumably be 
further enlarged and differentiated in the foreseeable future. 
There is no doubt that this is a scientifically desirable and 
promising development. However, the following caveat 
should be considered: The debate on future directions of 
psychiatric diagnosis critically depends on a sustained and 
substantial reflection on the epistemological frameworks 
involved. For example, how shall we integrate the notions 
of subjectivity, autonomy, and personhood with neuroscien-
tific data? In order to justify the designation of an important 
realm of current psychiatric research as social neuroscience, 
this question has to be answered. The proposals of “first-
person neuroscience”33 and “two-person neuroscience”34 are 
attempts to get ahead with this issue.
Generally speaking, any nosological and diagnostic 
approach developed by psychiatry ever since its begin-
ning carries, more or less, the risk of becoming rigid and 
dogmatic. Therefore, the essential ambition of the ongoing 
debate on psychiatric diagnosis should not be to ignore 
or just to replace previous concepts. This would indefen-
sibly narrow down the scientific scope of our field. Instead, 
social neuroscience, taken here as pars pro toto for recent 
conceptual and methodological advances in psychiatric 
research, should establish a conceptual dialogue, critical 
and constructive, with “classical” psychopathological 
concepts. The latter should not be scientifically devaluated 
only because they are part of a specific intellectual tradition.
The ambition to debate diagnosis in the abovemen-
tioned sense is supported by many seminal figures in 
the psychopathological tradition, especially Karl Jaspers 
(1883-1969). He declared a multidimensional, ie, episte-
mologically open-minded approach that engages in a crit-
ical dialogue between competing positions as necessary 
requirement of person-centered psychiatry. If we under-
stand psychopathology in this Jaspersian sense, ie, as a 
comprehensive intellectual framework rather than only 
a technical guidance for descriptive symptomatology, it 
might well regain the function of a conceptual bracket 
for psychiatry.35,36 Given the fragile sense of professional 
identity within psychiatry we presently witness, such a 
bracket is very much needed.
Conclusion: what psychiatric diagnosis in  
the 21st century is all about
What is diagnosis in 21st century psychiatry all about, 
and what ought it to be about? From a conceptual history 
perspective, in view of the many competing and at least 
partly incommensurable approaches to diagnosis that 
psychiatry has seen over the centuries, one cannot help but 
have the impression that psychiatric diagnosis is essentially 
about debate: This debate has been ongoing at least since 
the seminal work of Emil Kraepelin and, after a compa-
rably stable phase of international implementation of the 
two operationalized diagnostic manuals DSM-III17 and 
ICD-10,16 the field has become dynamic and substantially 
controversial again in recent years.
An essential background of this development is to be seen 
in new perspectives like computational and dimensional 
psychiatry, social neuroscience, or, generally speaking, in 
options for mental health issues that have arisen by “big 
data” and artificial intelligence. At first sight, these recent 
approaches might be regarded as predominantly method-
ological in nature; however, they do raise fundamental ques-
tions about psychiatric nosology and the epistemological 
status of diagnosis. This, for sure, is a positive development, 
since critical evaluation of any given concept is the very 
core of scientific progress. Therefore, RDoC, HiTOP, and 
comparable approaches are promising precisely by chal-
lenging traditional nosological and diagnostic concepts.
We have to be cautious however that their critique does not 
become dogmatic but is itself critically debated. As it stands 
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(November 2019), such critical debate certainly takes place 
about the scientifically promising and practically relevant 
ICD-11. Psychiatry, being as complex and entangled with 
a large variety of “external” factors as it is (and probably 
always will be), needs a substantial and sustained debate 
that addresses the foundations, including the conceptual 
history, of its nosological assumptions and diagnostic 
procedures. The latter are not only scientifically relevant, 
but also—explicitly or implicitly—underlie and thus guide 
everyday clinical work. The question should not be if we 
need a neurobiological, computational, or a psychopatho-
logical approach in psychiatry, but how to establish and 
foster a critical dialogue between these (and other) different 
perspectives.37
For practical diagnostic work, this means that psychiatric 
diagnosis encompasses more than technical aspects of 
symptomatology and patient interviewing, and that psychi-
atric diagnosis is never an end in itself, neither in clinical 
practice nor in research about diagnostic processes. Of 
course, it does include technique—eg, knowing the defi-
nitions of psychopathological terms like delusional ideas, 
hallucinations, stupor etc, and knowing how to establish a 
therapeutic relationship so that the patient feels comfort-
able telling the interviewer about personal issues that are 
typically part of his or her private sphere.38 But just as 
diagnostic systems are situated in a historical and cultural 
context, so is practical diagnosis situated in a cultural and—
most importantly—interpersonal context. The act of diag-
nosis must thus be seen as an interpersonal act. This act too 
ought to be dialogical.
Understanding diagnosis as dialogue fits well with a Jasper-
sian understanding of what psychopathology basically is 
about: Psychopathology, we suggest, offers a conceptual 
bracket that allows keeping together the necessarily different 
scientific perspectives of psychiatry condensing in manifold 
debates about diagnosis. It also offers a framework posi-
tioning the interpersonal realm at the heart of any clinical 
encounter, be it diagnostic in purpose or otherwise. Further-
more, it can serve as an epistemological barrier against unre-
flected or undetected simplifications of psychiatry. n
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